Just War Theory
It is just as utterly absurd and unnatural to justify all war as it is to condemn war outright. Both are hubris, a form of pathology. All those who hide behind pacifism, as well as those who constantly call for war against someone — no matter who — represent mental and psychological extremes.
Sometimes, war is inevitable. In other cases, it is entirely possible not to start a war. Any generalisation leads to absurdity.
The theory of just war emerged a very long time ago. Its purpose is to distinguish between when war is legitimate and when it is not (that is, when it is hubris).
Cicero formulated the concept of bellum iustum et pium (just and pious war), asserting that war is permissible only in retaliation for harm that has been inflicted or in defence of allies, with a formal declaration and without excessive cruelty. In a sense, this theory is reactive (war in response to war) and confined within ethical boundaries.
Blessed Augustine believed that war is permissible if it is waged for the sake of peace, has a just cause (restoring a broken order, defence against aggression), and a right intention (love, not hatred or a thirst for power) . Augustine permitted war as a lesser evil to prevent a greater one. Once again, reactive war is legitimised – but now within a Christian context (they started it, we will finish it, with love).
In medieval Catholic culture, Thomas Aquinas provided the classic formulation of the criteria for a just war: auctoritas principis – only a legitimate authority may declare war; causa iusta – the war must have a just cause; recta intentio – the war must have a right (ethically and religiously justified) intention. He also introduced the principles of proportionality and distinction (jus in bello).
Nevertheless, the Crusades – including the most savage of them, the Fourth, against Byzantium, which was essentially against us, the Orthodox – were justified.
In the 17th century, Hugo Grotius transposed this theory from the theological to the secular plane of natural law. Grotius identified three just causes of war, all of which derive from natural law (ratio naturalis) and the law of nations (jus gentium).
- Self-defence (defensio sui): against an imminent and real threat to life, limb or property. Lethal force is permissible even in the event of an attack without the intention to kill (for example, rape or maiming), because the aggressor’s intentions cannot be trusted. But only in the face of immediate danger – a preventive war based solely on suspicion is prohibited.
- Restoration of rights (reparatio iniuriae or recuperatio rerum): the return of seized property or territory, the fulfilment of contracts, and compensation for damage. This also includes rights to trade and navigation. War here is analogous to a legal action when there is no common judge.
- Punishment (punire): for the deliberate violation of natural law (piracy, cannibalism, refusal to trade). The right to punish originally belongs to all, but is usually exercised by sovereigns. Grotius even allows for intervention against ‘crimes against nature’, but with reservations: only serious crimes and taking the consequences into account (so as not to harm the innocent).
What is important here is that the theory of just war, in all its versions, attempts to define which wars are legitimate and which are not. There is a catch here. Whoever sets the rules embeds their own interests within them. And if someone does not wish to play by these rules established by others, they can easily be accused of violating the rules of ‘just war’ and, on that very basis, war can be declared against them.
Grotius himself faced the situation where the British Empire, then on the rise, declared the World Ocean the property of the English Crown, and the Dutchman Grotius (at that time the Netherlands was still a powerful maritime power) was outraged. This was unjust! But in whose eyes: in the eyes of a rival.
It is clear that a ‘just war’ is also a highly relative concept and depends on who is speaking about it – for whom it is ‘just’, and for whom it is not.
The Third World War, which is now beginning and which could lead to the destruction of humanity, raises the question of war and peace with renewed urgency. However, in order to avoid getting bogged down in demagoguery and propaganda, we should speak specifically about this war without generalising about any other wars.
A couple of days ago, Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi paid her respects at the grave of the pilot who dropped an atomic bomb on her people. It is clear that for a Japan like this, the only thing that will be ‘just’ is whatever the big American daddy says.
It is more important to understand who is involved in this war and on whose side they stand. The Third World War is a war between the unipolar world and the multipolar one. The unipolar world is represented by Trump and Israel, as well as the other blocs of the collective West (Britain, the EU and globalists in general). Some of them do not wish to enter this war, others are not opposed to it, but all of them will be forced to do so. This same pole also includes the West’s numerous vassals from among various civilisations – in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.
No matter what others say, for them this war will be entirely ‘just’. They are defending global dominance, which has been shaken by the pressure of an emerging multipolar world. It is important to bear this in mind: if one puts oneself in the shoes of the decision-making centre of unipolarity or unipolar globalism, then it is acting, on the whole, rationally. The Third World War aims to preserve, or at the very least prolong, the unipolar world order – in any of its forms:
- pure North American hegemony – aggressive and making no secret of its goals – world domination – Trump;
- regional dominance in the Middle East (on behalf of ‘Western civilisation’) – the case of Israel;
- the preservation of the global capitalist model (globalists);
- opposition to the growing sovereignty of Russia and, to some extent, China (the EU and the UK).
All five poles of the collective West (the US, Israel, the EU, Britain and the globalists), despite their individual differences, stand on the same side. They have different understandings of unipolarity and global hegemony, and they differ ideologically and on a number of specific issues, but overall they are historically and civilisationally united.
The opposing camp consists of us: Russia, China and Iran. And also the spirited and sovereign North Korea. These four countries form the core of BRICS. They represent almost fully-fledged civilisation-states. Iran’s desperate and successful resistance to American-Israeli aggression is elevating this power from the ranks of ordinary Islamic countries to a more sovereign and independent entity. North Korea lives within the sovereign Korean sphere with complete confidence and security.
In fact, it is the sovereignty of these powers that has created the conditions for the emergence of a multipolar world. Supporters of a unipolar world have responded to this with war. For the multipolar world, this war is entirely ‘just’ – iustum et pium. It was imposed on us by those who could not come to terms with the redistribution of the balance of power in the global architecture. We consider unipolarity ‘unjust’; they are repaying us in kind.
Thus, the Third World War is ‘just’ for its main participants, although everyone interprets ‘justice’ in their own way.
At the same time, both in the West and within the multipolar world, there are those who do not support the war. In the West, this essentially refers to those who, in one way or another, reject unipolarity and hegemony and therefore recognise multipolarity. Moreover, some take a softer line towards Russia, others towards Iran and Palestine, and others towards China.
Some believe that Netanyahu has dragged Trump into aggression against Iran. Some are convinced that supporting Ukraine against Russia has nothing to do with either American or European interests. And some consider that China is not a global adversary of the West. Opinions diverge on these matters, but this is a vast segment of Western societies that will undermine the West’s confidence in the ‘justness’ of the Third World War, as was the case during the Vietnam War in the US and Western Europe.
But we will certainly see something similar from the multipolar camp as well. And here, anti-war social groups will emerge. They would be the ones who are quite content with unipolarity, or, seeing no possibility of resistance and faced with the growing risks of humanity’s destruction, will propose surrendering to the enemy. For them, multipolarity and civilisational sovereignty do not represent decisive values, so fighting for them is ‘unjust’.
Those countries that do not belong to the Western world and are not its full vassals, and those who intuitively gravitate towards multipolarity or are directly part of BRICS, will find themselves at a crossroads. For them, the Third World War itself will be unjust, as they do not strictly link their fate to either unipolarity or multipolarity, but instead waver depending on the situation and the regional balance of power. The largest and most decisive player is India – a fully-fledged civilisation-state.
But the position of most Islamic countries, African states and Latin American nations has yet to be determined.
The Ukrainian conflict is merely one of the fronts in this war. For us, this war is not merely just, but sacred. For the collective West – especially for globalists, neocons, the EU and Britain – it is quite the opposite. And although this front is not the top priority for either Trump or Netanyahu, as the situation escalates and if they succeed in achieving their aims in the Middle East, and Trump implements his plans for the complete subjugation of Latin America to US interests (as set out in the new version of the National Security Doctrine), then Russia is the next target. And then China will follow.
For the West, these are all legitimate objectives in the war to preserve global dominance, unipolarity, and hegemony. The globalists preferred to conceal this behind ‘liberal-humanist’ rhetoric. Trump has cast aside these formalities as unnecessary hypocrisy and is waging war for the West practically openly and without restraint. For the West as a system, this is a ‘just’ war.
For a multipolar world, the war against the West is a just war. The West is on the offensive. Evidently, most participants in the multipolar process, including Russia, had hoped to avoid this direct confrontation, to postpone it, and to strengthen multipolarity gradually and step by step. But this has not succeeded. The situation in Ukraine has already led to direct military conflict with the West, whil Netanyahu’s radicalism and Trump’s full support for him have blown up the situation in the Middle East.
Now we must focus entirely on how to win this war, the Third World War. And, of course, in order to do this, we must first and foremost develop a global strategy. After all, those countries that are targeted by the collective West (with all five of its poles) essentially belong to our camp – this was true of Assad’s Syria and Maduro’s Venezuela, and it holds true for Iran and Iraq, for Cuba, Mexico, Colombia and Brazil. The situation is more complex when it comes to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the conflicts in Africa and Indochina. This requires further investigation.
All global and even regional players in the Third World War will have to define their position. Otherwise, others will define that position for them.
It is precisely in this context that we should understand talk of ‘war and peace’ and ‘justice and injustice’, of ‘us and them’ in the current circumstances.