Trump Wants to Attack Iran, But Does Saudi Arabia Hold the Keys?
I have been in contact with a friend who is privy to a source in West Asia that has some interesting insights into the behind the scenes activity to prevent a new US attack on Iran. Russia and China are busy trying to erect a new security architecture in the Persian Gulf, which includes Turkiye, that will push the US out of the Persian Gulf and leave the issue of security to Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye. Here is what my friend sent me today:
First, the Saudi position has evolved more than is generally appreciated. Riyadh was initially more open to a strike on Iran, but that stance has shifted sharply as the war has unfolded. The combination of Iran’s demonstrated ability to hit Saudi bases and infrastructure with missiles, and the visible presence of Pakistani troops and specialized personnel on Saudi soil, has pushed the Saudis toward a “defend the kingdom, avoid being the launchpad” posture. Pakistani units, including specialized air and air‑defense elements and military aircraft, are now operating on Saudi bases with a mandate that is clearly defensive. That gives the Saudis both political cover and operational capacity to say to Washington: we will prioritize the protection of our territory and regime, but we are not signing up to be the primary platform for a prolonged American air war against Iran.
In that context, two quiet developments are worth factoring into the picture. High‑level U.S. envoys have been moving through Islamabad carrying messages for Tehran, which suggests Washington is using Pakistan as an indirect channel to cool things down rather than prepare the ground for a full‑scale resumption of the war. On the nuclear track, Iran has shown some flexibility on enrichment parameters, but is holding a hard line on the fate of enriched stock: it is prepared to transfer some material to Russia, while firmly resisting any arrangement that would give Washington the kind of intrusive leverage it wants over its uranium inventory. That points toward managed friction and bargaining space, not capitulation.
Against that backdrop, a renewed major air war is still possible but, in my view, unlikely. If it does resume, it is very unlikely that Saudi Arabia or Qatar will allow themselves to be central players or primary platforms for U.S. operations. Both are already signaling, in different ways, that they do not want their airspace and bases to become high‑value targets in a contest whose escalation they cannot fully control. Pakistan’s defensive presence on Saudi bases reinforces that instinct: the implicit message is that these assets exist to shield the kingdom, not to facilitate someone else’s escalation ladder.
Overlaying all of this is a changed strategic landscape. China and Russia, together with Iran’s own indigenous capabilities, have used this period to refurbish and harden their war‑fighting tool kits across missiles, drones, air defense, and supporting systems. They are far better positioned to absorb and respond to pressure than they were a decade ago, and they are in no mood to accept Trump’s more egregious demands. That reality is understood in Riyadh, Doha, and Islamabad, and it further reduces the appetite to become the front line staging ground for a maximalist U.S. approach.
The net effect is an environment that favors pressure, probes, and coercive bargaining over a high‑tempo, Saudi‑enabled air campaign. Escalation can never be ruled out, but the structure of incentives for the key players – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Iran, and the China–Russia axis – points toward containment and negotiation rather than a sustained return to large‑scale war.
Iran has taken delivery by sea of a substantial shipment of CM‑302 supersonic anti‑ship cruise missiles from China, along with a large consignment of very advanced radar equipment from Russia. These systems are already on Iranian soil. In combination, they materially enhance Iran’s ability not only to defend its own airspace and coastline, but also to conduct offensive operations against major surface combatants, including large warships and carrier groups.
The CM‑302 is designed as a “carrier‑killer” class weapon: high‑speed, sea‑skimming, and optimized for attacking large naval targets in congested waters. Paired with upgraded long‑range and over‑the‑horizon radar from Russia, Iran’s kill chain—from detection and tracking to targeting and engagement—becomes markedly more robust. The result is a far more credible anti‑access/area‑denial posture in and around the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz than even a year ago.
In practical terms, this means that Trump and his military planners would have to undertake a serious double‑think before contemplating major operations against Iran, especially any concept that relies heavily on carrier strike groups operating in relatively confined waters. The cost, risk, and uncertainty associated with a large‑scale offensive have all increased.
The biggest news is the claim that China has supplied Iran with a sizeable shipment of CM-203 supersonic anti‑ship cruise missiles. If true, this means the threat to any US naval vessel that tries to pass through the Strait of Hormuz and enter the Persian Gulf has reached a new level of danger.
If Saudi Arabia renews its objection to the US using Saudi airspace or bases to launch a new attack on Iran, Trump may be forced to cancel the planned strikes, which many believe will take place later this week. Iran is not attacking its Gulf neighbors despite the claim earlier this week that Iranian drones hit near a nuclear power plant in the UAE. The drones reportedly were fired from Iraq. I believe this was a false flag by Israel in an attempt to incite the UAE and Saudi Arabia into joining the planned attacks on Iran.
If Iran is attacked it is prepared to launch immediate retaliatory strikes against those countries implicated in carrying out the strikes and in facilitating the bombings.
https://larrycjohnson.substack.com/p/trump-wants-to-attack-iran-but-does