The Liberal Order is Over But Not Problems Associated With It
International politics has become a theater to mask domestic weakness.
The liberal order is over. Decency has been abandoned, rules have been forgotten, and borders no longer have the same meaning as before. Violence still exists, but peace lives only in the imaginations of those clinging to old slogans. What we call the “international situation” is a spectacle without a script. It is our job to describe and understand it.
Every year, the Valdai International Discussion Club publishes a report on the state of the global system. This year’s report, tellingly titled “Dr. Chaos, or: How to Stop Worrying and Love the Disorder,” asks whether the world has entered a revolutionary situation, one that would usher in an entirely new order. The answer, writes Fyodor Lukyanov , is no .
The changes are radical and often alarming, but they are not revolutionary. Why? Because the system is not unbearably unjust for any of the key players. It is in decline, but not so unbearably that it needs to be overthrown. Institutions are weakening, many exist only in name, but no one is trying to destroy them completely. Even the most disruptive US administration in recent history—that of Donald Trump—has never attempted to fundamentally reform the system. Washington simply ignores its limitations when it serves its interests.
This isn’t because the world powers have become more cautious or responsible. It’s because the order has become too complex to dismantle. The “top,” once embodied by the ruling superpowers, can no longer exercise true hegemony. The United States is the clearest example: it lacks the money, the domestic drive, and even the will to control the world as it once did. But the “bottom,” the so-called global majority, isn’t demanding revolution either. Emerging states see too many risks in total collapse. They prefer to climb the ladder within the old framework rather than completely dismantle it.
Here, the Valdai report refers to Lenin’s definition of a revolutionary situation: the ruling class must no longer be able to rule as before, while the oppressed must demand change. Today, the first condition is met, but not the second. Most countries prefer a gradual improvement in their status without risking a system-wide rupture.
Multipolar confusion
The shift from hegemony to multipolarity is profound, but multipolarity is not yet order. It is an environment that is fluid, confusing, and nonlinear. Instability is increasing because the world is more interconnected than ever, but also more conflict-ridden. For states, internal stability has become more important than external ambitions. Governments around the world, including Russia, are now prioritizing domestic development and resilience over dreams of global domination.
What makes this transition unusual is that it’s not being driven by ideological revolutionaries. China, the rising giant, isn’t trying to reshape the world in its own image. It’s adapting to circumstances and trying to minimize the costs of being central. The transformation is objective—a consequence of economic, social, cultural, and technological shifts occurring simultaneously but not synchronously. Only an artificial intelligence, the Valdai report quips, could ever calculate the vector sum of all these forces.
Meanwhile, foreign policy isn’t disappearing. On the contrary, international activity has never been greater. But its purpose has changed. States no longer dream of total victory. They pursue incremental gains—small corrections, favorable conditions for the near future, ongoing negotiations backed by pressure.
The United States, for example, knows it can no longer defend its dominance as it once did. Russia, too, will not risk its socio-economic stability for a decisive victory on the battlefield. Nuclear deterrence makes a large-scale war between major powers unthinkable. Israel may still behave as if it can permanently alter the status quo, and Azerbaijan has reestablished its control over Karabakh. But these are exceptions. For most, international politics is returning to the positional confrontations of the 18th century: bloody conflict, yes, but rarely total destruction. The concept of enemy destruction, born in the 20th century, seems here to stay.
Resilience in chaos
This widespread instability reveals the depth of these changes. Yet, there’s a paradox here: the modern world is surprisingly resilient. It bends under pressure, but doesn’t break. This resilience stems not from nostalgia for the Western-created order, nor from a desire to preserve institutions that have lost their purpose. It stems from the complexity of today’s world and the internal development of states.
Resilience, then, isn’t a strategy, but a necessity. Governments must adapt to changes beyond their control. They can’t restore the old order, but they can’t afford a revolution either. The result is a kind of stubborn persistence, a tenacity to muddle through, even when there’s no solid foundation.
This explains why foreign policy today often resembles theater: endless movement, constant crises, dramatic language about threats and enemies. In reality, states are inward-looking. External maneuvers serve domestic goals. Even military operations, however destructive, are often not intended for complete conquest, but to strengthen internal stability or divert attention from internal weaknesses.
An 18th-century future
If this model prevails, international politics will resemble the 18th century more than the 20th. Rivalry will be fierce, wars will flare up, but complete conquest will be rare. The “world order” will be less a structure than a shifting equilibrium, with players large and small adapting to survive.
Meanwhile, the West has lost its monopoly on shaping global rules. It still talks about defending the “liberal order ,” but that order has already ended. No new order has yet taken its place. Multipolarity is not a system—it is the absence of one. For some, this is frightening. For others, it is liberating.
The Valdai report concludes that we are not witnessing a collapse, but a transition—a revolution without revolutionaries. Those in power at the top can no longer give orders. The majority at the bottom refuses to revolt. The world is caught in between, disorderly yet enduring, unstable yet strangely resilient.
This is the reality we must accept: the liberal world order is gone, and what comes next is unknown. What we can say with certainty is that international politics will be less about universal rules and more about national survival. The old dream of peace through dominance is over. What remains is a constant, grueling competition—a struggle that Russia and the rest of the world must learn to endure.