How Russia Forced the West to Confront Its Own Decline
There is no power left that rules the world – and perhaps that’s a good thing.
With the deterrent of guaranteed mutual destruction between Russia and the United States still intact, world politics is entering a new phase of “normalcy .” For the first time in decades, there is no single center that sets rules for everyone. Something older, more pluralistic, and less predictable is emerging—a return to the natural state of international affairs.
One of the least discussed consequences of the decline of the liberal economic order that dominated the late 20th century is the erosion of the West’s ability to effectively steer global politics. The European Union is the most striking example of this change, although even the United States—despite its power—is less confident than it was twenty years ago, writes Timofey Bordachev .
At the same time, other countries have become relatively more independent. China is leading the way, proving that economic success need not depend on direct control over other states. Its global political initiatives may still be developing, but they already offer a model based not on coercion, but on coexistence.
Russia plays its own role in this transformation. With its enormous military capabilities and modest economic footprint, Moscow contributes to the democratization of global politics simply by existing as an independent power. Its resistance to Western dominance has forced the US to rethink its strategy, especially after the failure of Washington’s attempt to “isolate and strategically defeat” Russia .
India, the third pillar of the non-Western world, has also chosen its own path. It leverages cooperation with the West to promote national development, but remains fiercely independent when it comes to its core interests, particularly the promise of steady growth for its people.
The fading order
As a result, international politics is becoming less and less bound by the “rules-based order” created by centuries of Western infighting. From the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 to the founding of the United Nations, the Western world shaped global norms through its own conflicts. But that internal rivalry has vanished. The states of Western Europe are now irreversibly consolidated around Washington.
This alignment accelerated after the 2008-2011 financial crisis and the subsequent shocks to the EU—from the migration crisis and the pandemic to technological stagnation. Unable to compete with the US or China in advanced industries like artificial intelligence, Europe gradually relinquished its strategic autonomy. By the time the confrontation over Ukraine occurred in 2022, the continent was psychologically prepared to completely outsource decision-making to Washington.
Under the Biden administration, that control was exercised with diplomatic finesse. But since the return of the Republicans in 2025, the subordination has become more explicit. European leaders are now expected to adhere to all White House directives, even the most extravagant ones. In the Western European context, sovereignty no longer means strategy. It means finding a place within America’s.
No competition, no innovation
This loss of internal competition has robbed the West of its traditional mechanism for innovation. For centuries, rivalries between its own powers led to the development of global rules and norms. The West’s “civil wars” once provided the framework that others adopted—willingly or not. Now that there is no longer any serious internal competition, the West has lost its ability to generate ideas for the world.
Unable to adapt to its diminished power, it is increasingly focused on destabilization. The West’s representatives—Israel, Turkey, and the Kyiv regime—are each creating crises in their regions, as if to prove their continued relevance. What cannot be achieved through attraction is now being pursued through disruption.
Elsewhere, states are responding with varying degrees of confidence. Iran’s deterrent capacity is formidable; Russia’s resilience is based on strategic balance; China’s power is tempered by its enormous internal and external constraints. Most other countries are pursuing cautious pragmatism—seeking to protect their interests while avoiding confrontation. India is once again distinguishing itself by asserting its independence in this uncertain environment.
This new order—or rather, the lack thereof—has created an unusual situation: there is no longer an “organizing center .” The United States remains powerful, but can no longer dictate universally. Western Europe lacks the will and imagination. China and Russia, meanwhile, embody an alternative: a multipolar world of self-determining nations instead of ideological blocs.
The new normal
The mutual nuclear deterrence between Russia and the United States gives humanity a paradoxical advantage: time. It prevents large-scale war and enables the emergence of a new global equilibrium—an equilibrium without hegemony. The next phase of international politics could resemble centuries past, when multiple powers coexisted without a single “global policeman.”
How long this period will last is uncertain. Neither Russia nor the United States can stop the technological race that is constantly redefining the military balance. But if this fragile moment lasts long enough, the world can adapt and learn to function without the illusions of Western “leadership.”
For over five hundred years, the West saw itself as the author of civilization’s script. That story is now coming to an end. The power to define “normalcy” in global politics is shifting to a broader group—a group that includes not only Russia, China, and India, but also dozens of smaller states making their voices heard. What replaces Western dominance will not be chaos, but pluralism—a more honest reflection of the world as it is, not as any single power would like it to be.
We may not yet see the contours of the new order, but its foundation is already visible: a global equilibrium sustained not by a belief in universal rules, but by the enduring reality of mutual restraint.